

***United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit***



**BRIEF FOR
APPELLANT**

77-1075

In The
UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS
For the Second Circuit

Docket No. T-6981

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM G. WRIGHT
Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal From The United States District Court
For The Western District of New York

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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


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Preliminary Statement

William G. Wright (hereinafter "appellant")
appeals from a judgment of conviction entered December
20, 1976, in the Western District following a jury trial
at which appellant was convicted of making a false de-
claration to a grand jury, 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The indict-
ment arose out of an investigation by the grand jury
into alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 1341 re-
lating to the settlement of automobile accident claims
submitted to insurance companies by a City of Buffalo
attorney, Kevin J. Brinkworth, on behalf of his clients
(A 5).*

* Indicates Joint Appendix page number.

In connection with this investigation, the grand jury made an inquiry of the relationship between appellant and attorney Brinkworth, namely, the latter's submission of a claim in respect to an automobile accident which occurred on January 24, 1972, involving appellant. On the basis of appellant's testimony before the grand jury he was indicted on two counts, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503; 1623. Upon completion of the Government's case, appellant's motion for acquittal was granted in respect to count two 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and denied relative to count one. A further motion relative to the materiality of the questions and answers contained in the indictment was granted in part and denied in part (A 184-189). Thereafter, a redacted copy of the indictment was prepared for presentation to the jury wherein an underline was placed at those portions of the answers the Government contended were false (R 16-26). After the jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of count one, he was sentenced to a term of six months (A 335).

Questions Presented

1. Were all of the underlined answers (alleged false testimony) capable of influencing the grand jury in

respect to the subject investigation of attorney Kevin Brinkworth?

2. Assuming arguendo that materiality is demonstrated, was the evidence sufficient to prove that appellant's declarations before the grand jury were willfully false?

Statement of Facts

Sometime in or about April 1, 1974, an investigation commenced in respect to alleged fraudulent medical bills, medical reports and lost wage statements which had been submitted to several insurance companies by Buffalo attorney Kevin Brinkworth on behalf of his clients (A 40).

Pursuant to this investigation, the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute forwarded to a United States Postal Inspector, Clifton M. Harm, Jr., several insurance company files (A 40). Subsequently, these files were presented to United States Attorney, Richard J. Arcara (A 40-41). Several meetings between Postal Inspector Harm and the U. S. Attorney ensued, after which time it was determined to present the matter to the grand jury (A 41).

Thereafter, the grand jury subpoenaed the files of other insurance companies as well as requesting from the Judicial Conference of New York all retainer statements that

had been filed by attorney Brinkworth on behalf of his clients (A 43). A consequence of this request was the grand jury's receipt of a retainer statement filed by attorney Brinkworth relative to appellant (A 44). However, the retainer statement neither contained appellant's signature nor any other notation that would indicate appellant had knowledge of its existence (A 45).

After receipt of approximately five hundred Retainer Statements (A 49), other insurance files relating to automobile accidents of which Brinkworth was the attorney of record were then subpoenaed by the grand jury. Inspector Harm testified that the investigation focused on the inquiry of whether the insurance files contained fraudulent medical bill, medical reports and lost wage statements (A 46) and resulted in the issuance of approximately two hundred and twenty subpoenas (A 49; 55).

Inspector Harm further testified there was only one Retainer Statement for appellant (A 49). With respect to appellant's knowledge of the documents contained in the insurance file relating to appellant's accident, Inspector Harm testified as follows (A 49-51):

Q. You stated that you reviewed the medical bills for Police Officer Wright, is that correct?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. You also reviewed the lost wage claim for Mr. Wright, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall what his lost wages were?

A. There apparently was some confusion in the insurance company file.

Q. No, after the confusion was cleared up?

A. Okay. After the confusion was cleared up, there were no lost wages for Mr. Wright.

Q. The only damages would have been the medical bills, is that correct?

A. That's correct.

THE COURT: The only special damages?

MR. SARGENT: Special damages, yes, sir. I am not a negligence lawyer, as you might know, members of the jury.

Q. Was there any information in the file that would indicated that Police Officer Wright had seen those medical bills?

A. No.

THE COURT: I think counsel is asking you up to and including the time that he testified, did he ever see them, that you know?

A. There was no indication in the insurance file that he had ever seen them, no.

Q. Was there any information in the files that the medical bills were sent directly to the attorney?

- A. I believe that the medical bill has Mr. Brinkworth's address on it.
- Q. Was there an envelope in the file that would have been attached to the medical bill?
- A. No.
- Q. So the only notation on the medical bill would have been Mr. Brinkworth's address?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was there any information in the insurance file in respect to Police Officer Wright's situation, that Police Officer Wright received any monies from this claim?
- A. No, there was no indication in the file.

Following this testimony, the Government's next witness was a Walter J. Lohr, a claims adjuster from a Buffalo insurance company, Allied Claim Services. Mr. Lohr testified that he had the occasion to work as an adjuster on a claim filed on behalf of the appellant (A 60), but that he never talked to appellant since all settlement negotiations were through appellant's attorney (A 63).

Mr. Lohr further testified that the insurance file (Government's Exhibit 6) contained documents relating to a diagram of the scene of the accident (A 65); a bill from Millard Fillmore Hospital for X-rays (A 67); a bill for \$225.00 from a John P. Mernan, M.D., and a medical report

setting forth the nature and extent of injuries and treatment (A 70-71).

The trial judge noted, however, "I don't see much purpose in reading any more from this file [Government's Exhibit 6] unless it is something that the jury can reasonably infer that it was either signed by Mr. Wright or passed through him - - it is in evidence. It shows it is in existence. I think you should go on to something else" (A 74).

On cross, Mr. Lohr testified that the accident did, in fact, result from a police emergency call (A 99); that Dr. Mernan's bills and X-rays were address to appellant's attorney and the lost wage statement was mailed not from appellant but from the Police Administrator to attorney Brinkworth (A 99-101).

The Government then elicited testimony from a secretary in the Medical Records office of Millard Fillmore Hospital relative to identification of an out-patient X-ray (Government's Exhibit 12) of appellant taken on February 8, 1972 (A 105).

Officer Richard Marvin of the Buffalo Police Department was called as a witness and testified that he and

appellant, driving the evening of January 24, 1972, were responding to an emergency call when in route to the call they had an accident (A 107). Officer Marvin further testified that subsequent to the accident he had the occasion to discuss with appellant representation by attorney Brinkworth of their respective accident claim (A 114-115). However, in response to the question whether he or appellant had heard anything from attorney Brinkworth in respect to settlement, Officer Marvin stated: "it was negative answers all the time. Neither one of us had heard" (A 115). With respect to the number of occasions Officer Marvin and appellant had seen each other from the date of the accident up to their grand jury appearance, the former stated two or three times. It was also established that Officer Marvin testified before the grand jury immediately prior to appellant (A 116).

Testimony of Victoria Carey, the individual driving the other vehicle involved in the accident, was also elicited by the Government. Mrs. Carey testified that she was involved in an automobile accident on January 24, 1972; that on such evening just prior to the accident she heard sirens and saw lights flashing from a police car; and that the police vehicle went into a skid, hit the back end of

her car and ripped of the left rear fender (A 128-129). Mrs. Carey was able to describe the police officers in the police vehicle only to the extent that: "The driver was black, and the other gentlemen who was the passenger was a white policeman who was a little older." (A 129-130). She testified in the negative to the question whether the "black police officer" discussed any injuries subsequent to the accident (A 133).

On cross-examination, Mrs. Carey stated that after being served with a subpoena she discussed the case prior to the time with an Assistant U. S. Attorney, Theodore Burns (A 136):

"A. Well, I spent about a little over an hour with him, I would say.

Q. You say 'with him.' With who?

A. With Mr. Burns.

Q. A little over an hour reviewing it?

A. I would say a little over an hour, just sort of talking about what had happened and that sort of thing."

A Buffalo Police Captain, Floyd J. Edwards, testified about the training of Buffalo Police Officers. In response to a question in respect to the type of training they have in testifying in court, Captain Edwards stated,

"To answer questions asked of you, not to volunteer anything . . . " (A 138). Further testimony was elicited with respect to a police precinct teletype message. One of the entries on the message dated January 24, 1972, indicated an accident and a Patrolman Richard Marvin reporting off sick (A 144). In addition, Captain Edwards testified appellant did not have any absence from employment during the fourteen-day period ending February 9, 1972 (A 148).

On cross-examination Captain Edwards noted that it was normal procedure for a police officer, in preparation of his giving testimony at a trial, to bring in his notebook which is part of the police officer's equipment (A 152). The obvious purpose in referencing the notebook was to call the jury's attention to the fact that a police officer does not rely solely on his memory to recall events. In light of Captain Edward's testimony, the Government then decided to call an additional witness (A 151) to testify to the training courses the appellant received at the Buffalo Police Academy in 1970 (A 159). The trial judge then treated the Government's case as having been rested but for that one witness (A 159).

This was the state of the record when appellant renewed his motion "to strike out all of the questions and answers in Count 1, or each of them, one by one, on the theory

either that, one, the prosecution has not shown enough evidence so that a reasonable jury acting reasonably could infer willful falsity beyond a reasonable doubt; and the second, that the particular question and answer was not material." (A 163).

The trial judge granted appellant's motion to dismiss count two (A 181) and denied all motions in respect to count one with the exception of striking one question and answer (A 185). Thereafter, and upon conclusion of the appellant's defense, a redacted indictment was presented to the jury (A 16-26). In his charge to the jury, the trial judge stated (A 303-304):

"Now in a moment I will read to you part of Count 1 of the Indictment. There is a copy which will be made available to you for your use in the jury room, which has underlined on it those answers which the Government contends and the defendant denies are knowingly false. It is not contended that all the answers are false -- some additional testimony has been included in the Indictment to give you some indication of the context of the answers claimed to be false. You have available to you all the testimony given by Mr. Wright. And that also should be considered by you to determine the context of the answers claimed to be false. You are not to consider as false any material which is not underlined on a copy of the Indictment given to you. The charges here are limited to the underlined answers only, any one of which may constitute a false declaration which, if all the elements of the crime which I'm about to explain to you are satisfied, will be a basis for conviction." (Underscoring ours.)

And further on (A 311):

"It is not necessary that the Government prove that every listed answer is false. It is sufficient if you find that any single listed underlined answer contained in the Indictment is false."

And further on (A 312):

"As I mentioned before, where there are several specifications of falsity in a single-Count Indictment, proof of any one of the specifications is sufficient to support a verdict of guilty."

During the jury's deliberation, a note was received by the trial judge which read (A 322-323):

"Request three things that the jury has to know before bringing forth a verdict."

In relevant part, trial judge responded (A 323):

"The second element, that the matters about which it is charged he testified falsely were material to the issue under inquiry by the Grand Jury.

"Third, that the defendant then willfully made at least one false statement under oath among those as set forth in the Indictment and underlined, knowing that statement to be false." (Underscoring ours.)

A second note was then received stating as follows (A 324):

"Is withholding information the same as making false material declarations?" (Underscoring ours.)

The trial judge's instructions, in pertinent part, follows (A 327-328):

"I think an examination of the underlined answers will show that in most cases the answer or the effect of the answer is 'I don't remember,' and it would be withholding information to answer by saying, 'I don't remember' if you really do remember." (Under-scoring ours.)

One hour and twenty-five minutes later the jury reached a verdict.

Point One

Since the redacted indictment charged forty-two false statements in one count, and the jury was instructed that it may predicate a guilty verdict upon any one, the appellant is entitled to a reversal on appeal upon a showing of error as to any one statement.

It is respectfully submitted that numerous questions and answers in the redacted indictment should not have gone to the jury since they were insufficiently material to support a conviction. The specific answers and our reasoning follows:

"Q. Have you had more than ten accidents?

A. I couldn't say" (A 18).

Appellant identified the subject accident in his prior answer when he remembered one accident "because of

talking to Mr. Marvin." (A 18). Moreover, the grand jury had received from the New York Judicial Conference one Retainer Statement relative to an accident involving appellant and the numerous insurance files contained one claim filed by attorney Brinkworth on behalf of appellant. Thus, the appellant's testimony of whether or not he had other accidents was immaterial to the grand jury's investigation "relating to the negotiation and settlement of automobile accident claims submitted to insurance companies by an attorney, Kevin J. Brinkworth, on behalf of his clients." (A 5). We fail to understand in what manner appellant's loss of recall to "more than ten accidents" frustrated the grand jury's inquiry. United States v. Lee, 509 F.2d 645, 646 (2d Cir. 1975).

Accordingly, the argument here is not that the grand jury already knew about the January 24, 1972 accident. Rather, since attorney Brinkworth had submitted only one accident claim to the insurance company involving appellant, materiality focused on the circumstances surrounding the January 24, 1972, incident and attendant medical treatment, time lost from employment, etc. The Second Circuit has previously enunciated the applicable standard in respect to "materiality" under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 in United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 68, 71 (1974):

"The test of materiality in a perjury

case is whether or not the false testimony was capable of influencing the jury on the issue before it [citations omitted]." (Emphasis supplied.)

Expressed another way, "the false declaration must tend to 'influence, mislead or hamper' the grand jury's investigation of a matter which is within its authority to investigate. United States v. Koonce, 485 F.2d 374, 380; Dolan v. United States, 218 F.2d 454, 458, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 923, 75 S.Ct. 665, 99 L. Ed. 1255; see Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763, 47 S.Ct. 477, 71 L. Ed. 880." United States v. Lasater, 535 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1976). It bears repeating that the grand jury's inquiry in question related to the negotiation and settlement of automobile accident claims submitted to insurance companies by attorney Brinkworth. A priori the question relating to the number of accidents in excess of ten appellant was involved in is immaterial as a matter of law.

"Q. Were you injured in this automobile accident?

A. I believe. I remember going to a doctor. Was I injured? I think—
I don't know. I don't remember.

Q. You don't remember whether you were injured in the accident?

A. It wasn't serious if I was.

Q. It was not serious?

A. I don't remember having any serious injuries." (A 18-19).

Based on the foregoing colloquy, appellant is accused of making a false declaration as to his injuries. However, when the question is repeated appellant states: "I don't remember having any serious injuries." This is deemed to be a truthful declaration inasmuch as it is not underlined. In light of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (d), it is respectfully submitted that since appellant's earlier declaration had not "substantially affected the proceeding," the latter admission that appellant was not seriously injured should bar prosecution of the above underlined answer. As this Court aptly observed in United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 665 (1975):

"The purpose [subdivision (d)] was obviously to induce the witness to give truthful testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without incurring the risk of prosecution for doing so." (Emphasis supplied.)

"Q. Did you lose any time from work on account of this accident?

A. I don't remember.

Q. You don't remember?

A. No, I don't. I—I'm very vague in that three years ago is a long time." (A 21).

* * *

"Q. You say you didn't lose any money from work?

A. I don't remember." (A 22).

* * *

"Q. Did you lose any time from work?

A. I don't know." (A 24).

Prior to appellant's testimony, the grand jury knew that attorney Brinkworth did not submit a claim on behalf of appellant for lost wages.* It is manifest, therefore, that these questions were wholly immaterial to the grand jury's investigation of "claims submitted to insurance companies by attorney Kevin J. Brinkworth, on behalf of his clients." (A 17). Thus, the questions and answers, as a matter of law, should not have been submitted to the jury.

For the same reason, it was immaterial and highly prejudicial to repeat and repeat and repeat the question whether appellant remembered the number of visits to the doctor's office. In the insurance file (Government Exhibit 6) a statement from Dr. Mernan indicated the purported medical treatment appellant received and the number of visits. Assuming that Dr. Mernan's medical report indicated appellant

* A letter dated October 16, 1972, from George Nowadly, Police Administrator, was contained in the insurance file indicating no lost time (A 101). This letter corrected the May 1st communication (A 100).

made 10 visits. How in the world is it relevant to the grand jury's investigation of inflated medical bills to ask the question, "did you see him [doctor] more than forty times?"; or "How about one hundred times, Mr. Wright?" In the very minimum it cannot be gainsaid that the redacted indictment was so prejudicial that appellant was denied a fair trial since approximately twenty questions (in respect to the number of doctor visits) were repetitive, in view of the appellant's initial response, "I don't recall." (A 20).

Analogizing from United States v. Camporeale, 515 F.2d 184 (1975) to the factual situation presented here, we respectfully submit that since the issue before the jury was whether appellant intentionally lied in testifying that he could not remember, the jury's perusal of a document so excessively repetitious "could well have led it to resolve that issue against him." 515 F.2d at 188.

And further on (A 23-24):

"Q. How many times did you see the police surgeon?

A. I don't remember I'm sure he would have a record of it."

* * *

"Q. Did you lose any time from work?

A. I don't know.

Q. You mean if you had an accident and like you say this is your first accident you have ever been in that you reported a claim, you wouldn't know if you lost any time from work?

A. I don't know if I lost any time. I'm sure his records would clarify it."

We fail to understand, in light of the fact that appellant admitted the information was available in police department records, in what manner these answers influenced, impeded or hampered the grand jury's investigation. Here, as in United States v. Lasater, supra p. 1048, the conclusion is inescapable that it cannot be demonstrated that the grand jury was left with "no place to go" by appellant's testimony and accordingly, as in Lasater, the questions should be held immaterial.

The trial judge's charge to the jury, in no less than six separate portions, contained the statement that the jury could find the appellant guilty if at least one false statement among those underlined in the Indictment was proven. While we do not challenge the well established rule permitting

the inclusion of several specifications of falsity in a single count, United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218 (2d Cir. 1976), nevertheless, there is no way of knowing whether the jury based its verdict upon those questions that were not material. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311 - 312, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356 (1957). Indeed, this Count in the Bonacorsa case cited Vitello v. United States, 425 F.2d 416 (1970) where the Ninth Circuit significantly held (425 F.2d at 419):

"In Yates, the court submitted to the jury two overt acts, including an overt act which had been barred by the California statute of limitations. Since there was no way of knowing whether the jury based its verdict upon the barred act, or the other alternative, the Supreme Court reversed.

"For the purposes of this decision, we accept the appellant's view of the effect of Yates, and that the teaching of that decision should be here applied . . ."

Simply stated, had the court in Vitello (supra) found there was insufficient evidence on any one or more of the specifications of falsity submitted to the jury, the conviction would have been reversed.

Paraphrasing Vitello, we would respectfully submit the appellant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction if "any one or more" of the specifications of falsity were not

material. In point of fact the jury's second note inquired (A 324):

"Is withholding information the same
as making false material declarations?"
(Underscoring ours.)

Indeed, the trial judge's response to this question highlighted his earlier instructions that the jury should examine the underlined answers ("I don't remember") and that a verdict of guilty may be predicated on any single listed underlined answer. Since the trial judge paid lip service to our motion to scrutinize every question in respect to materiality^{*}, there is no way of knowing whether the jury found appellant "withholding information" relative to a question that was not material.

In conclusion, on this contention, brief comment is warranted in anticipation of the argument that there are a sufficient number of questions that were material which warrants a finding that the case against appellant is overwhelming. The hardihood of any such suggestion overlooks the fact that a man's life, at the age of thirty-five, has been ruined. At the sentencing the trial judge noted appellant had "rounded out a very fine career . . . people have testified, and have written letters, and they were

* "Now I would prefer to take the entire transcript and take this question under advisement until we return on Tuesday." (A 163). See also (A 162).

quite voluminous. You are ruined as a policeman from now on." (A 334). Can this Court assume, without any degree of certainty, that the jury's verdict was predicated upon a material false declaration? In a balancing of equities, we would hope that a man's livelihood and the right to pursue his chosen career are paramount to the avoidance of a new trial.

Point Two

Viewed in light most favorable to the Government, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time defendant testified before the Grand Jury he knew his testimony to be false.

It is black letter law that the verdict of the jury must, of course, be sustained "if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942).

Assuming arguendo all the questions were sufficiently material, the evidence was inadequate to prove that appellant falsely answered the questions as he understood them. As the

"Watergate" cases so appropriately concluded:

"Of course, in the absence of a statement by the defendant, the falsity of an 'I don't recall' answer must be proven by circumstantial evidence."
United States v. Chapin, 515 F. 2d
1274, 1284 (1975).

With this principle in mind, we respectfully submit a reasonable jury could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstantial evidence demonstrated appellant knowingly made false declarations. To begin with, appellant was questioned relative to the circumstances surrounding an automobile accident which occurred on January 24, 1972 - - three and a half years prior to appellant's grand jury appearance. In his own defense appellant stated that he testified "to the best of my recollection" considering three and a half years had transpired until the time he was called and considering he did not have access to notes or reports (A 206). Appellant also noted that in more than one instance he called to the grand jury's attention the source of the information requested in the questions (A 207). This testimony, therefore, put in issue whether there did in fact exist evidence to demonstrate that appellant withheld information when he responded, "I don't recall" or "I don't remember."

It is recognized that issues of credibility, the

weight of evidence and conflicts in evidence are, of course, matters for the jury. However, a defense that relates to an element of the crime must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975). Accordingly, the issue presented here is whether appellant's testimony is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of any reasonable jury.

Appellant's defense presented as a witness a former instructor at the Buffalo Police Training Academy. He conclusively rebutted the Government's contention that a policeman is trained to remember facts without the benefit of reports or notes and significantly stated that a police officer is not instructed to speculate as to events (A 189).

Appellant took the witness stand in his own defense. He restated that the instructor in the Training Academy emphasized that he should never render a speculation, guess or personal opinion as to circumstances surrounding a case upon testifying in a court of law (A 199). He then asserted that when called to testify before the grand jury in May of 1975, he did not have any notes or reports, or in fact did the U. S. Attorney furnish him with any material

to recall the facts surrounding the automobile accident. He said that at the time the accident occurred he was assigned to Precinct 6 -- the busiest precinct house in the City (A 201). When asked about his testimony before the grand jury and the extent of his injuries, the appellant stated that he in fact testified he did not remember sustaining any serious injury. Furthermore, he reminded the jury that in response to a question relative to the number of times he was examined by the police surgeon, he responded he did not remember but I am sure he would have a record of it (A 212). Appellant also noted to the jury that upon being questioned as to the individual who referred him to Dr. Mernan, he stated that it must have been attorney Brinkworth or Police Officer Marvin (A 212). Finally, appellant testified that he neither received any money from the accident claim (A 213), nor was there a motive for him to testify falsely on behalf of attorney Brinkworth (A 214) since his relationship with the attorney was casual at best.

The full transcript of the appellant's testimony supports the appellant's contention that he was intimidated, harassed and badgered before the grand jury.* (A 215).

* At one point, the Assistant U. S. Attorney stated that the appellant's testimony was "incredible and unbelievable." (A 217).

The defense also demonstrated through the testimony of character witnesses that appellant's reputation was one of honesty, trustworthiness and that the community in which he lived and worked held him in high esteem.

In sum, viewing appellant's testimony in juxtaposition with the circumstantial evidence presented by the Government's case (supra pp. 3-10), it must be concluded that a reasonable jury could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's declarations were willfully false.

Conclusion

The foregoing reasons and authorities conclusively demonstrate that appellant is entitled to a reversal of the judgment of conviction and to a remand to the District Court for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served two copies
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief upon counsel for
the Government by hand delivering same to:

Richard J. Arcara
United States Attorney
U.S. Courthouse
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This 29th day of March, 1976.



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